This paper is an attempt to solve the following problem: given a logic, how to turn it into a paraconsistent one? In other words, given a logic in which ex falso quodlibet holds, how to convert it into a logic not satisfying this principle? We use a framework provided by category theory in order to define a category of consequence structures. Then, we propose a functor to transform a logic not able to deal with contradictions into a paraconsistent one. Moreover, we study the case of paraconsistentization of propositional classical logic.
The problem examined in this paper is: given a logic in which ex falso holds, how can it be converted into a paraconsistent one? Or, is there a procedure for paraconsistentizing a logic? Formally, given a logic L 1 such that ϕ, ¬ϕ ⊢ L1 ψ, we have to find a procedure to turn L 1 into a logic L 2 such that ϕ, ¬ϕ L2 ψ. Further, if L 1 has a set of properties C, then, does a paraconsistent version of it, let's say, L 2 , preserve some of these properties?
The problem above combined with the idea of a paraconsistentization has been addressed by Costa-Leite in [7] . However, the author did not present a general and unified method for producing paraconsistentization, but rather he proposes only particular ways of turning classical logic and modal logics into paraconsistent logics. Previously, Beziau in [2] showed how to get some paraconsistent logics from modal logics using translations of logics, but this is not a method to convert any given logic into a paraconsistent one. In the spirit of the goal of this paper, combinations of paraconsistent with modal logics convert these into logics capable of tolerating inconsistencies. This approach has been developed by people working with fibring logics, especially in the paper [4] . Afterwards, Payette in [16] explored a way of generating inconsistent non-trivial logics from consistent ones using a variation of forcing. Differently, Caminada, Carnielli and Dunne studied in [5] a semi-stable semantics able to find criteria for a given formal system to have paraconsistent characteristics.
Our approach uses tools from category theory and general abstract logic in order to provide a way to paraconsistentize any logic. The aim is to get a general, unified and abstract perspective by means of a functor from the category of explosive logics (accepting ex falso) to the category of non-explosive logics (rejecting ex falso). The idea of using category theory to reason about logic is very popular recently, but studies connecting paraconsistency and categories are rare, and we could mention, for instance, the case of [19] and also [13] .
In order to give an answer to the problem raised in [7] , we start by defining a category of consequence structures (logics in a very abstract sense) called CON , and we examine some remarkable features of it. Then, we define a functor using the category CON and show some properties preserved by this functor (the paraconsistentization functor). We proceed by defining paraconsistent consequence structures and presenting some sufficient conditions to convert a given logic into a paraconsistent one. By the end of this article, a particular paraconsistentization is presented. We take the case of classical propositional logic and show how to paraconsistentize it.
2 The category CON Alfred Tarski, in [17] and [18] , came up with a definition of logical consequence (i.e. consequence operator) which allowed logicians to reason at the abstract level, characterizing this notion by some conditions which are known as Tarskian. In this paper, we do not impose any condition on the consequence operator Cn (e.g., inclusion, idempotency, monotonicity, finiteness and so on). Tarskian structures are particular cases of consequence structures.
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A consequence structure is a pair (X, Cn) such that X is a set and Cn is an 1 Logical structures without axioms or restrictions are proposed in [3] . operation in ℘(X), the power set of X:
If A is a subset of X, Cn(A) is the set of Cn-consequences of A in the structure (X, Cn). The set X is called the domain of the structure and Cn is its consequence operator.
We say that a subset A ⊆ X is Cn-consistent if Cn(A) = X; otherwise, A is called Cn-inconsistent.
In what follows, if f : X → X ′ is a function, we use also f : ℘(X) → ℘(X ′ ) to denote the function f extended to the power sets. If A ⊆ X, we have:
Let (X, Cn) and (X ′ , Cn ′ ) be two consequence structures. A homomorphism
(ii) h preserves the consequence operator, that is, the following diagram is commutative: 
Cn
Thus
, for all A ⊆ X. Since h is an injection, we have that homomorphisms preserve consistent sets.
Compositions of homomorphisms are homomorphisms and the identity function on X is a homomorphism. Compositions satisfy associativity and identities satisfy the identity laws. Therefore, we have the category of consequence structures, denoted by CON , whose CON -objects are consequence structures and CON -morphisms are homomorphisms.
We analyze some properties of CON . Proposition 2.2. CON is neither (finitely) complete nor (finitely) co-complete.
Proof. We prove that CON does not have limits and co-limits for the empty diagram. Suppose that CON has terminal object (X, Cn) and card(X) = κ. Consider (Y, Cn ′ ) such that card(Y ) > κ. Since there is no injection from Y to X, there is no morphism in CON from (Y, Cn ′ ) to (X, Cn). But this is in contradiction with the initial supposition. Therefore, CON does not have terminal object. In SET , the category of sets, ∅ is an initial object. If CON would have initial object, its domain should be ∅. But, in this case, the consequence operator would be Id {∅} , that is an injection. On the other hand, a CON -morphism h from (∅, Id {∅} ) to (X, Cn) would be such that h(∅) = ∅. But, it is easy to see that, in this case, the following diagram 
The task to determine whether CON has some other universal constructions should still be explored in detail, and they are beyond the scope of the present paper. We intend also to study the case in which CON -morphisms are not injections but only preserve consistent sets.
The functor P
Let us construct an endofunctor P on the category CON that will be called paraconsistentization functor.
If (X, Cn) is a consequence structure, we define a new operation Cn P : ℘(X) → ℘(X) such that, for all A ⊆ X:
In this way, we have that x ∈ Cn P (A) if and only if there exists A ′ ⊆ A Cnconsistent such that x ∈ Cn(A ′ ). Now, we define the action of P on CON :
• For CON -objects (X, Cn), P(X, Cn) = (X, Cn P );
• For CON -morphisms h, P(h) = h. Proposition 3.1. P is an endofunctor in the category CON .
Proof. Consider the following diagram:
. 
h
We have to prove that (X, Cn P )
is, in fact, a morphism. That is, we have to verify that for all A ⊆ X, it holds that h(Cn P (A)) = Cn ′ P (h(A)), i.e., the following diagram commutes: 
Cn P
The computation is straightforward, using lemma 2.1:
The verification of functorial properties is immediate.
Let us examine which properties of the consequence operator Cn are preserved by the functor P. d) We say that Cn satisfies finiteness iff we have that:
Therefore, x ∈ Cn(A) iff there exists a finite subset A ′ of A such that x ∈ Cn(A ′ ).
Proposition 3.3. Let (X, Cn) be a consequence structure and A ⊆ X. Then, it holds the following results:
Proof. a) Immediate from the definition of Cn P . b) By part a) we have Cn(A) ⊆ Cn P (A). Suppose that x ∈ Cn P (A). Then,
Proposition 3.4. The functor P enforces monotonicity. In other words, if A ⊆ B, then Cn P (A) ⊆ Cn P (B).
Proof. Suppose A ⊆ B and x ∈ Cn P (A). Then, there is some Cn-consistent subset A ′ ⊆ A with x ∈ Cn(A). But that same A ′ is a Cn-consistent subset of B with x ∈ Cn(A). So, x ∈ Cn P (B). Proposition 3.5. The functor P preserves finiteness, i.e., if Cn satisfies finiteness, then Cn P also satisfies finiteness.
Proof. Suppose that Cn satisfies finiteness. Let x ∈ Cn P (A). By definition of Cn P , there exists A ′ ⊆ A, Cn-consistent, such that x ∈ Cn(A ′ ). So, there is a finite A * ⊆ A ′ such that x ∈ Cn(A * ). Since Cn satisfies finiteness, Cn(A * ⊆ Cn(A" ′ ), so A * is Cn-consistent as well. By proposition 3.3 (a), since A * is Cn-consistent, we have Cn(A * ) ⊆ Cn P (A * ), so x ∈ Cn P (A * ). Therefore, there exists A * ⊆ A, finite, such that x ∈ Cn P (A * ). On the other hand, suppose that there is a subset A ′ of A, finite, such that x ∈ Cn P (A ′ ). So, by proposition 3.4, Cn P (A ′ ) ⊆ Cn P (A), and x ∈ Cn P (A).
We say that a consequence structure (X, Cn) is normal (or Tarskian) if and only if the consequence operator satisfies inclusion, idempotency and monotonicity. Proposition 3.6. If (X, Cn) is normal and there is u ∈ X such that {u} is Cn-inconsistent, then in (X, Cn P ) there is no Cn P -inconsistent sets.
Proof. Consider the hypotheses and suppose, ad absurdum, A ⊆ X such that Cn P (A) = X. So, u ∈ Cn P (A). Therefore, there is A ′ ⊆ A, Cn-consistent such that u ∈ Cn(A ′ ). Hence, {u} ⊆ Cn(A ′ ) and we have
Corolary 3.7. In the conditions of the proposition above, we have P(P(X, Cn)) = P(X, Cn) = (X, Cn P )
i.e., the functor acts in an idempotent way.
Proof. By proposition 3.6, every subset A of X is Cn P -consistent. Therefore, by proposition 3.3 (b), Cn P (Cn P (A)) = Cn P (A).
We will see, in the section 5, that the functor P preserves neither inclusion nor idempotency. 4 
Paraconsistent consequence structures
We will show that a paraconsistent transformation indeed turns structures that satisfy ex falso quodlibet into a consequence structure in which this principle fails. In order to do so, we have to introduce some conventions and definitions.
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From now on, we suppose that the set X is endowed with an operator intended to be a negation operation, denoted by the symbol ¬. Thus, if x ∈ X, then ¬x ∈ X and ¬x is called the negation of x. Definition 4.1. Let (X, Cn) be a consequence structure.
1. We say that (X, Cn) satisfies ex falso quodlibet (or satisfies explosion, or is explosive) iff for all A ⊆ X, if there is x ∈ X such that x, ¬x ∈ Cn(A), then Cn(A) = X (i.e., A is Cn-inconsistent). Otherwise, (X, Cn) is called paraconsistent.
2. We say that (X, Cn) satisfies joint consistency iff there exists x ∈ X such that {x}, {¬x} are both Cn-consistent and {x, ¬x} is Cn-inconsistent.
3. We say that (X, Cn) satisfies conjunctive property iff for all x, y ∈ X, there exists z ∈ X such that Cn({x, y}) = Cn({z}).
Now, we present a sufficient condition for the paraconsistentization functor P to transform a consequence structure into a paraconsistent one. Therefore, that functor deserves its name! Theorem 4.2. If (X, Cn) is normal, explosive, satisfies joint consistency and also conjunctive property, then (X, Cn P ) is paraconsistent.
Proof. Since (X, Cn) satisfies joint consistency, there exists a ∈ X such that {a}, {¬a} are both Cn-consistent. Consider A = {a, ¬a} and, then, Cn(A) = X. By inclusion, A ⊆ Cn(A) and by joint consistency, A ⊆ Cn P (A). As (X, Cn) 4 If we want to enforce inclusion, we could make a slight modification in the definition of P in order to include A into Cn P (A), such that
satisfies conjunctive property, there exists c ∈ X, Cn({c}) = Cn(A) = X. We will show that c / ∈ Cn P (A), i.e., (X, Cn P ) is paraconsistent. The set A has three Cn-consistent subsets, that is: {a}, {¬a} and ∅ (the empty set). (∅ is Cn-consistent for ∅ ⊆ {a} and, by monotonicity, Cn(∅) ⊆ Cn({a}) = X.) We have to show that c does not belong to the operator Cn applied to these sets. If c ∈ Cn({a}), then {c} ⊆ Cn({a}). By monotonicity, Cn({c}) ⊆ Cn(Cn({a})). By idempotency and inclusion, X ⊆ Cn({c}) ⊆ Cn({a}), i.e., Cn({a}) = X (contradiction!). The same argument shows that c / ∈ Cn({¬a}). Finally, if c ∈ Cn(∅), then {c} ⊆ Cn(∅). So, we have, X = Cn({c}) ⊆ Cn(Cn(∅)) = Cn(∅) (contradiction!); therefore, (X, Cn P ) is paraconsistent.
In the next section, we study a particular case of paraconsistentization.
Paraconsistentization of propositional classical logic
Let X be the set of formulas of an usual propositional language with ¬ (negation), ∨ (disjunction), ∧ (conjunction), → (implication) and propositional letters: p, q, r, ..., p 1 , q 1 , r 1 , ... and so on. Let Cn be the standard consequence operator of the propositional classical logic. Let (X, Cn P ) be the result of the action of P on (X, Cn). We call (X, Cn P ) a propositional paraclassical logic. We proceed to study some properties of (X, Cn P ).
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For convenience, we use A ⊢ a to denote a ∈ Cn(A). On the contrary, we use A a. Similarly for A ⊢ P a.
Proposition 5.1. Inclusion and idempotency do not hold in (X, Cn P ). Therefore, these properties are not preserved by the functor P.
Proof. For inclusion, notice that {p ∧ ¬p} P p ∧ ¬p because ∅ is the only Cn-consistent subset of {p ∧ ¬p} and ∅ p ∧ ¬p. For idempotency, let A = {p, ¬p}. Then, p ∨ q, ¬p ∈ Cn P (A). Therefore, q ∈ Cn P (Cn P (A)), but q / ∈ Cn P (A).
It is well known that (X, Cn) satisfies the property of transitivity: if A ⊢ b for every b ∈ B and B ⊢ a, then A ⊢ a. Moreover, we have a weak form of transitivity: if A ⊢ b and {b} ⊢ c, then A ⊢ c. Proposition 5.2. Transitivity does not hold in (X, Cn P ).
Proof. Consider A = {p, ¬p}, B = {p∨q, ¬p} and a = q. Then, {p, ¬p} ⊢ P p∨q, {p, ¬p} ⊢ P ¬p, {p ∨ q, ¬p} ⊢ P q, but {p, ¬p} P q.
For weak transitivity, we need a preliminary result. In (X, Cn), we say that a ∈ X is a Cn-contradiction iff {a} ⊢ p ∧ ¬p. Moreover, a is a Cn-theorem iff ∅ ⊢ a. Proof. Immediate from the definitions.
Proposition 5.4. Weak transitivity holds in (X, Cn P ). That is, if A ⊢ P b and {b} ⊢ P c, then A ⊢ P c.
Proof. Since {b} ⊢ P c, there are some Cn-consistent K ⊆ {b} with K ⊢ c. Either K = ∅ or K = {b}; these are the only two subsets of {b}. In the first case, c is a Cn-theorem, and so A ⊢ c, by the Cn-consistency of ∅ and monotonicity of Cn P . In the second case, {b} ⊢ c. Since A ⊢ P b, there are some Cn-consistent A ′ ⊆ A with A ′ ⊢ b. By the transitivity of Cn, this gives A ′ ⊢ c. So, there is some Cn-consistent A ′ ⊆ A with A ′ ⊢ c; that is, A ⊢ P c.
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In (X, Cn), it holds the deduction theorem
Proposition 5.5. The deduction theorem is valid in (X, Cn P ).
Proof. Suppose that A ∪ {a} ⊢ P b. Then, there exists B ⊆ A ∪ {a}, Cnconsistent, such that B ⊢ b. We have two cases: 1) B ⊆ A. In this case, B ∪ {a} ⊢ b and B ⊢ a → b, by deduction theorem for (X, Cn). Since B is Cn-consistent, we have that A ⊢ P a → b.
2) B A. In this case, we have B − {a} ⊢ a → b and B − {a} is Cn-consistent.
And this completes the proof.
Notice that modus ponens does not hold in (X, Cn P ), for example in the case that the conclusion of the rule would be a Cn-contradiction. By the same reason, the converse of deduction theorem does not hold in (X, Cn P ). For example, we have A ⊢ P (p ∧ ¬p) → (p ∧ ¬p), but A ∪ {p ∧ ¬p} P p ∧ ¬p.
A set A ⊆ X is called Cn-contradictory iff there is a formula a such that A ⊢ a and A ⊢ ¬a. We say that A is Cn-strongly contradictory iff there is a Cn-contradictory formula a such that A ⊢ a. Moreover, we say that A is Cn-paraconsistent iff A is Cn-consistent and Cn-contradictory. The same definitions hold for Cn P .
In (X, Cn), there are no Cn-paraconsistent sets. On the other hand, in (X, Cn P ), we have Cn P -paraconsistent sets but we do not have neither Cn Pinconsistent sets nor Cn P -strongly contradictory sets.
We can summarize the results of this section in the following table.
Cn Cn P finiteness monotonicity inclusion × idempotency × transitivity × weak transitivity deduction inconsistent sets × contradictory sets strongly contradictory sets × paraconsistent sets × means that the operator of the consequence structure has the property or there are sets as indicated. × means the contrary.
Conclusion
Newton da Costa conjectured in many different places that all logics can be adapted in order to become paraconsistent. The device used in the present work realizes this task. All theories, regardless of their nature, require an underlying logic. In most cases, this logic is classical and, thus, contradictions are not allowed. The price to pay for finding a contradiction is sometimes too high that the theory has to be abandoned or reformulated. Notwithstanding, paraconsistentizing the underlying logic can save a given theory. Basically, methods of paraconsistentization have applications wherever paraconsistency plays a role: solving epistemic paradoxes, dealing with deontic dilemmas, modelling inconsistent reasoning in general, and everywhere we need logics for underlying contradictory but non-explosive theories, we can apply the methodology developed here. Therefore, the methodology proposed has a very large range of application in contexts involving contradictions. We have developed a way to convert a given logic into a paraconsistent one. In particular, we focused on doing this by way of functors defined in categories where consequence structures are objects. This kind of approach can be featured in universal logic. Instead of exploring particular logical systems, universal logic investigates all possible logics (see [3] ). As pointed out in [7] , there is no unique method for paraconsistentizing a given logic, but rather a plurality of them. In this sense, paraconsistentization is for paraconsistent logics what universal logic is for logics in general. Therefore, it is a general theory of paraconsistent logics. Indeed, there are many methods and ways one can use in order to paraconsistentize a given non-explosive logic. These other possibilities should still be studied.
Our approach to paraconsistency does not coincide with other researches especially because our paraconsistentization is realized without explicit mention to the concept of negation. It produces an unexpected result: modus ponens is not generally valid.
9 This can be a contribution to discussions regarding the nature of paraconsistency and its relation with negation. 10 In addition, it offers another way to deal with inconsistency. Suppose a logician trying to formalize a given theory and investigating its logical consequences. Then, an explosive logic -which seems to be adequate for some tasks -is chosen. Nonetheless, during the investigation, contradictions are found and they cause trivialization of the system. By applying a paraconsistentization functor, it is possible to restrict the domain of the original explosive logic to the consistent subsets of the theory. The advantage os this approach is that it is able to keep main characteristics of the input logic and, in particular, its theorems. Thus, for example, an intuitionist logician can still study a constructive theory -and yet inconsistent -using the paraconsistent counterpart of it, hence keeping crucial features of the intuitionistic logic but without trivialization.
Last, but not least, the work developed by Rescher and Manor (in [15] ) presents logical machinery for obtaining non-trivial consequences from inconsistent sets. Our task is not a generalization of their work. There are essential differences. Notice that the notion of consistency in our paper is independent of any underlying language and, in particular, it is independent of the concept of negation, while their characterization of consistency relies on a previously established language. In addition, their paper contains a very strong presupposition: it is not rational to accept all consequences of inconsistent premises (p.182). This reasoning presupposes exactly one of the core philosophical tenets that paraconsistent logics try to overcome, namely: the parochial thesis according to which consistency is a necessary condition for rationality (for a survey of the philosophical implications of paraconsistency, see [11] ). Once a paraconsistent logic is formulated, the consequences of inconsistent premises are no longer trivial, so they can all be accepted rationally.
In conclusion, future lines of research could include exploring other universal properties holding in the category CON , as well as examining more properties preserved (or lost) when the paraconsistentization functor is applicable. In a less abstract mode, we can think about consequence structures endowed with syntactical and semantical dimensions; and, at this level, questions of whether metalogical properties like soundness and completeness are preserved by paraconsistentization could also be examined.
